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CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN NEW 
CALEDONIA: BUILDING THE MWÂ KÂ
NIC 
MACLELLAN
In the language of Djubéa-Kaponé from 
the south of New Caledonia, Mwâ Kâ means 
‘the big house’ – the high chief’s house that 
all people belong to. But can all the population 
of this French Pacific territory live together 
peacefully in one house?
Between 1984 and 1988, New Caledonia was 
wracked by violent clashes, following an election 
boycott launched by the independence movement 
Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste 
(FLNKS). Two decades later, this conflict has 
been replaced by a new engagement with French 
institutions, following the 1988 Matignon-
Oudinot Accords and the 1998 Noumea Accord. 
Today, the FLNKS has entered the institutions 
of government, and Kanak independence leaders 
serve in a multi-party executive alongside their 
conservative opponents.
Since the conflict of the 1980s, New 
Caledonia is often presented as a haven of 
stability in the region, in comparison to 
neighbouring Melanesian countries like Papua 
New Guinea and Solomon Islands. But this paper 
will argue that there are  cultural, political and 
social tensions in New Caledonia, and the issue 
of peace building and reconciliation is just as 
relevant today for the French dependency as for 
neighbouring independent countries. 
New Caledonia faces similar challenges to 
its Melanesian neighbours, even though massive 
French financial transfers have given the territory 
one of the region’s highest per capita incomes: 
how to involve the indigenous population 
in local and national governance; promote 
economic rebalancing between the capital and 
the bush; provide suitable education and jobs for 
young people; halt the HIV / AIDS pandemic; 
manage the wealth of the territory’s vast natural 
resources. 
A focus on ending armed conflict needs 
appropriate and ongoing efforts to address the 
sources of conflict: clashes between land owners, 
government and transnational corporations over 
distribution of natural resources; the impact of 
resource projects on culture and environment; 
militarised responses from the State to the 
demands of landowners, indigenous groups 
and movements for democratic rights and self-
determination; and social conflicts arising from 
the effects of economic “reform” programs, with 
responses from urban squatters, trade unions or 
isolated rural communities.1
Since the clashes of the mid-1980s, pro- 
and anti-independence forces in New Caledonia 
have negotiated political agreements to end 
the upsurge of armed violence. After a complex 
series of negotiations, the Noumea Accord for 
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New Caledonia was signed on 5 May 1998 by the 
Government of France, the conservative settler 
party Rassemblement Pour la Calédonie dans la 
République (RPCR) and the Kanak independence 
coalition Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et 
Socialiste (FLNKS). 
There is an extensive literature in English and 
French on the economic, legal and constitutional 
changes in New Caledonia that has contributed 
to the process of peace building and reconciliation 
after the conflict of the 1980s.2 
This process involves efforts at economic 
ré-équilibrage (rebalancing), to deal with the 
legacies of over 150 years of colonial rule. Since 
the 1980s, there have been major programs of 
land reform, and attempts to restructure control 
and exploitation of New Caledonia’s vast reserves 
of strategic minerals – especially nickel – and 
maritime resources (fisheries and sea-bed oil and 
gas reserves).3
There are also significant constitutional 
changes to New Caledonia’s status within the 
French Republic, creating “shared sovereignty” 
and a new citizenship for New Caledonians. 
These changes have ended the previous status 
as a territoire d’outre-mer (overseas territory) of 
France and New Caledonia has developed a 
unique political status within France’s network 
of “overseas collectivities”. There are new 
political institutions (three provincial assemblies, 
a national Congress and a Kanak customary 
Senate), together with a multi-party Cabinet 
that unites pro-and anti-independence leaders.4
However, a focus on constitutional change 
and civil and political rights downplays the larger 
question of addressing the underlying causes of 
conflict, often relating to issues of land, cultural 
identity, leadership and social and economic 
rights. As one Pacific activist has noted: 
There is a limit to legislative justice. You 
cannot legislate away racial discrimination 
or for peaceful co-existence. Enlightened 
constitutions and legislation must be 
supplemented by social engineering 
initiatives that are aimed at social cohesion 
and human security in a multi-ethnic milieu. 
These must include educational curricula 
that promote multi-ethnic tolerance 
and unity. It must include afﬁrmative 
action or social justice programs that are 
geared towards rebalancing the inequities 
in access to educational, commercial 
opportunities and state services (health, 
water, electricity) and resources that were 
inherited from the colonial government. 
It must include national dialogue between 
the different racial and ethnic groups to 
address the ‘problems of history’ relating 
to the alienation of land and natural 
resources during the colonial era, and also 
the place of indigenous peoples in the 
scheme of democratic governance.5
Therefore this paper will focus on community 
reconciliation as a vital part of the peace building 
process. 
In journalistic shorthand, New Caledonia’s 
conflict is often presented as “Kanaks versus 
French”. But the complexities of reconciliation 
arise from the  interplay of class and ethnicity – as 
in all recent Pacific crises, conflicts within ethnic 
communities are as significant as those between 
ethnic communities. There are also political 
differences between locally born New Caledonians 
(Kanak and “Caldoche”), public servants and 
military personnel from metropolitan France 
(the “metros”), and immigrant communities from 
other French territories. 
New Caledonia’s population has evolved 
through the process of colonial settlement and 
immigration, and the indigenous Melanesian 
population is currently a minority in its own 
land. Today’s political institutions are the latest 
attempt to recognise the rights of indigenous 
Kanaks, but also those of the “victims of history” 
– the descendants of convicts and settlers who 
have been born in New Caledonia, and those 
immigrants from other French colonies (such as 
Wallis and Futuna and the New Hebrides) who 
have made New Caledonia their home.6
In Pacific cultures, the public expression of 
peace and reconciliation is a central element 
of conflict resolution.7 Grassroots activists 
around the region are drawing on a synergistic 
mixture of Christian and Melanesian values to 
promote “restorative justice” – for example, in 
Bougainville, reconciliation efforts emphasise 
traditional peace-making processes to promote 
the reconstruction of social harmony and 
transcend the “payback” mentality.8 
Many organisations have also drawn on 
traditions of spiritual peacemaking, given 
the central role played by Christian churches 
throughout the region. In New Caledonia, 
Christian theologians like Pastors Pothin Wete 
and Wanir Welepane have contributed to a 
theology that recognises Kanak heritage.9 
A notable feature of efforts for peace building, 
reconciliation and reconstruction after recent 
Pacific conflicts has been initiatives by women. 
Advocacy centres have combined with local 
women’s groups to address the specific impacts 
of violence against women during and after 
situations of armed conflict, as has been seen 
in Bougainville, Timor Leste and Solomon 
  Conflict and Reconciliation in New Caledonia: Building the Mwâ Kâ
3
1988. In the subsequent melée, three gendarmes 
were killed and another mortally wounded.13 
Twenty-seven others were taken hostage and 
hidden in caves in the north of the island, near 
the village of Gossanah. The Ouvea crisis led 
to a major military mobilisation on the island, 
and the torture and maltreatment of villagers by 
French troops trying to find the location of the 
hostages.14 Djubelli Wea, a former Protestant 
theology student and leading independence 
activist from Gossanah was dragged from his 
sick bed, questioned about the location of the 
hostages, and tied to a tree. His father, beaten by 
French troops, later died.
The assault on the caves to free the captured 
police co-incided with a final (and unsuccessful) 
attempt on the part of then Prime Minister 
Jacques Chirac to glean votes between the two 
rounds of the 1988 Presidential elections. The 
conservative government wanted to show it 
would not bow to Kanak demands – Overseas 
Territories Minister Bernard Pons even discussed 
use of a 250 kilo napalm bomb which would have 
killed both the hostages and hostages takers.15 
On 5 May 1988, the French government 
abandoned negotiations and launched a military 
attack, with elite police and a commando unit 
storming the cave. Nineteen Kanak activists 
were killed, with at least three executed after 
surrendering. Their leader Alphonse Dianou 
was shot in his knee during capture, and left 
to die.16 Twenty-nine other men from around 
Ouvea, including Djubelli Wea, were arrested 
and transported to jail in Paris. Ouvea was left 
with a legacy of bitterness and tragedy – men 
from over half the 27 villages in Ouvea were 
dead or in jail, and tensions were created with the 
FLNKS leadership. 
The Ouvea tragedy made all parties step back 
from the brink and incoming Prime Minister 
Michel Rocard proposed negotiations, leading 
to the 1988 Matignon and Oudinot Accords. 
The Accords included a provision for amnesty 
for crimes committed before August 1988. After 
the Accords were approved by referendum in 
November 1988, the French Parliament extended 
the amnesty to those charged with murder, 
covering both the killers of the four police at 
Fayaoue and the police and soldiers responsible 
for the alleged torture at Gossanah and murder of 
surrendering Kanaks.
But the legacy of grief and division after the 
Ouvea massacre contributed to the assassination 
of Kanak leaders Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwene 
Yeiwene. The two FLNKS leaders came to the 
island on 5 May 1989 to mark la levée du deuil, 
the end of a year-long period of mourning. At 
Islands.10 Like other Melanesian countries, this 
is also apparent in New Caledonia, where Kanak 
women’s groups and organisations like SOS 
Violences Sexuelles are involved in a range of 
activities to support women and children affected 
by sexual violence, assault or rape.11
Some of the most successful reconciliation 
processes have involved the often undervalued 
Pacific traditions of consensus and la parole – the 
power of the spoken word, talking together, shame 
and personal pledges of commitment. Custom, 
ceremony and a sense of history are a crucial part 
of post-conflict reconciliation, together with the 
importance of time – allowing people to meet, 
consult and decide at their own pace. But not 
all these processes have been successful, and it’s 
important to compare and contrast experiences 
across the region.
This paper discusses examples of on-the 
ground reconciliation efforts by NGOs, churches 
and indigenous groups in New Caledonia, 
drawing on custom and Christian values that 
meet with the values and experience of island 
communities. It discusses the success and failure 
of four initiatives: attempts to bring together 
communities destroyed by the Ouvea crisis of 
1988-89; the erection of the Mwâ Kâ in Noumea; 
efforts to end armed clashes in Saint Louis; 
and the transformation of local literature, art 
and history to promote Kanak identity while 
recognising the rights of immigrant and settler 
communities.
A) RECONCILING GOSSANAH AND 
THE TRAGEDY OF OUVEA
The 1988-9 Ouvea crisis has become an 
important symbol of New Caledonia’s conflict, 
creating political, moral and social gulfs that are 
only slowly being bridged by the current mood of 
reconciliation.
Throughout the conflict of the mid-1980s, 
Kanak tactics were marked by alternating periods 
of violence and negotiation.12 With dialogue 
impossible after the introduction of the 1987 Pons 
statute, the FLNKS moved to boycott the May 
1988 French Presidential elections, and elections 
on the same day for a new local government. The 
FLNKS had planned a nationwide mobilisation 
to highlight its opposition to French policy, but 
the uprising took place only in Canala on the 
main island of Grande Terre, and on Ouvea in the 
Loyalty Islands.
As part of the uprising, a local group of Kanak 
independence activists attempted to take over a 
police station at Fayaoue on Ouvea on 22 April 
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the ceremony, Tjibaou and Yeiwene were shot 
and killed by Djubelli Wea, who was immediately 
gunned down by Tjibaou’s bodyguard.
These events meant that the people of Ouvea, 
and especially the community of Gossanah, 
were isolated politically and morally from many 
New Caledonians. This included much of the 
independence movement, because Tjibaou 
was a charismatic and popular leader of the 
FLNKS.17 For many years, the community could 
not recover from the 1988 Ouvea massacre and 
the 1989 assassinations, and a sense of isolation, 
frustration and bitterness marred their capacity 
to rebuild links with the FLNKS leadership. 
The Gossanah community largely supported the 
“Front Anti Néo-colonialist”, made up of various 
forces opposed to the 1988 Matignon Accords, 
which led to divisions in subsequent years that 
were slow to heal.
Journalistic shorthand, which dubs the 
slain Kanak leaders as “moderates” versus the 
“extremists” of Ouvea, masks a more complex 
reality.18 The reconciliation process – between 
the Gossanah community, the family, clan and 
supporters of the slain FLNKS leaders, and the 
families and supporters of the four slain police 
officers – has involved a complex process of trust 
building that has broader national implications.
The author travelled with a delegation to 
Ouvea in August 1990, just 15 months after 
the killing of Tjibaou, Yeiwene and Wea, and 
was invited to visit Gossanah. At the time, 
the community was widely shunned, and some 
people regarded contact with the militants on 
Ouvea as a slur on the memory of the two FLNKS 
leaders. For others, their deaths were seen as 
part of a more complex whole – on the same 
visit, I saw a mural to commemorate the “three 
leaders” painted on the side of a bus shelter near 
Tiendanite, on the east coast of Grande Terre. 
The mural, in the style of a Christian triptych, 
showed Tjibaou flanked by both his lieutenant 
Yeiwene and his assassin Wea.19 
On Ouvea, the 19 slain Kanak activists were 
buried together at Wadrilla – over time, their 
graves were transformed into a shrine, with 
elaborate marble headpieces. The veneration of 
“the 19” was matched by an opposing French 
campaign to recognise the four gendarmes killed 
in the assault on Fayaoue on 22 April, and the 
two commandoes killed in the assault to release 
the hostages. In France, the “Comité du 22 
Avril 1988 à la mémoire des gendarmes d’Ouvea” 
– a solidarity committee for the police officers 
– gained support from the Right and maintains a 
polemical campaign against the French Socialist 
Party, which granted amnesty to the killers. The 
Committee set about creating four memorials 
around France for the four policemen, which 
were unveiled in 1989, 1992, 1994, and 1995. 
Every year, they still organise a ceremony to light 
a flame at the Arc de Triomphe in memory of the 
Fayaoue gendarmes.20
In 1995, an attempt to reconcile the divided 
Kanak families and clans was initiated by Anselme 
Poaragnimou (a customary leader who today serves 
as chairman of the Paicî-Ciamuki customary 
council). Poaragnimou started travelling from 
Poindimié to Tiendanite (Tjibaou’s village near 
the east coast town of Hienghene), to Ouvea, 
then to Yeiwene’s home on the island of Mare, 
always using the traditional paths that link clans 
all over the country, across the mountains and 
the valleys, across the sea.
The negotiation of the Noumea Accord in 
April 1998 opened the way for more public 
gestures of reconciliation. As French political 
leaders prepared to travel to New Caledonia for 
the signing of the agreement on 5 May (the 9th 
anniversary of Tjibaou’s death), they felt a need 
to mark the events in Ouvea. Thus on 22 April 
1998, a decade after the attack on the Fayaoue 
gendarmerie, an ecumenical service was held 
in a Catholic church on Ouvea to mark the 
reconciliation of the Ouvea community and the 
police force.
Further gestures of reconciliation were 
to follow. In August 1998, France’s Overseas 
Territories minister Jean-Jack Queyranne, from 
the French Socialist Party, travelled to Gossanah 
and planted a tree in the village. This first visit 
by a government minister was an important 
symbol, breaching the tribe’s isolation. It also 
signalled a political shift for key Ouvea activists, 
from opposition to the 1988 Matignon Accords 
towards support for the 1998 Noumea Accord. 
Queyranne later told the National Assembly in 
Paris:
I want to recall the memory of an intense 
moment, one afternoon in mid-August 
this year in Ouvea. I saluted the memory 
of the police ofﬁcers at the monument at 
the police headquarters at Fayaoue, I was 
received at the monument for ‘the 19’, and 
I was the ﬁrst member of the Government 
to visit Gossanah. After the traditional 
welcome and the exchange of customary 
gifts, the chief and the pastor took the 
microphone to recall the trauma that 
the tribe had suffered ten years ago, and 
welcomed me as a representative of the 
French Republic. After having afﬁrmed 
their strong and ongoing commitment to 
the independence struggle, before me they 
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called on those assembled to vote ‘yes’ in 
the referendum [to approve the Noumea 
Accord]. We saw the positive outcome of 
this in Ouvea on 8 November [date of the 
referendum].21
The central role of the churches is a 
crucial element in the Kanak struggle and the 
reconciliation process for Gossanah. It’s worth 
remembering that Jean-Marie Tjibaou was a 
former Catholic seminarian; leader of the Ouvea 
hostage takers Alphonse Dianou trained for the 
priesthood at the Pacific Regional Seminary 
(PRS) in Suva; Djubelli Wea did pastoral training 
at the Pacific Theological College (PTC) in 
Suva; and leading Kanak theologians Jean Wete 
and Pothin Wete are originally from Gossanah. 
In 2000, the main Protestant denomination 
Eglise Evangélique en Nouvelle Calédonie (EENC) 
held its synod in Gossanah. EENC President 
Pastor Jean Wete went on to play a central role 
in the reconciliation process between the Wea, 
Tjibaou and Yeiwene families. Joined by Father 
Rock Apikaoua (Vicar General of the Catholic 
Church in New Caledonia), Pastor Wete worked 
over five years after the Noumea Accord to 
promote dialogue, face-to-face meetings and 
ultimately reconciliation between the wives, 
then the children and then the clans of the three 
central figures of the Ouvea tragedy. Although 
some family members were reluctant to participate 
in the process and many tears were shed, this 
process has been vital in sealing a breach that 
could not be healed by judicial mechanisms.
Another set of ceremonies was held around 
the country on 5 May 2001, the thirteenth 
anniversary of the deaths of Tjibaou and 
Yeiwene. Then FLNKS President Rock Wamytan 
expressed:
the wish that New Caledonian and Kanak 
collective memory does not forget the sacrifice 
of its 19 valorous men of Ouvéa, which inspired 
the intelligence of all parties to come up with the 
Matignon Accords. May they remember too that 
the charismatic memory of Jean-Marie and Yéyé 
has strongly influenced on the decision to pursue 
peace through the Nouméa Accord.
By 2003, even Brigitte Girardin, Overseas 
Minister from President Jacques Chirac’s 
conservative UMP party, felt obliged to travel 
to Ouvea to mark this spirit of reconciliation. In 
June 2003, in the lead up to the French President’s 
visit to New Caledonia the following month, she 
was welcomed by local authorities in ceremonies 
at the gendarmes’ memorial at Fayaoue and the 
Wadrilla gravesite for the 19.
During his July 2003 visit to New Caledonia, 
President Chirac stressed the importance 
of consensus and reconciliation between the 
territory’s different ethnic communities. In a 
major speech in Noumea’s Place des Cocotiers, 
President Chirac said France and New Caledonia 
could work together “hand in hand” for the 
future. 
But President Chirac has made no public 
atonement for his personal role in the events of 
1988. When Chirac travelled to the northern 
town of Kone in July 2003, his visit was marked 
by protests, with nearly 1,000 members of the pro-
independence party Union Calédonienne and 
the trade union confederation USTKE rallying 
against the President’s visit. Police fired tear gas 
to disperse the crowd, but the wind blew the 
tear gas back across the official welcoming party. 
USTKE spokesman Pierre Chauvat explained:
Remember that when Chirac was Prime 
Minister between the two rounds in the 
Presidential elections in 1988, he took 
the responsibility to murder 19 Kanaks 
in Ouvea. So we said to him that he had 
Kanak blood on his hands.22
It seems that the spirit of reconciliation 
only goes so far. In the face of ongoing political 
differences, the Ouvea tragedy still has vital 
symbolic power.
B) ERECTING THE MWÂ KÂ IN 
NOUMEA
A central feature of the Matignon Accords 
and the Noumea Accord is economic, social and 
political re-equilibrage (rebalancing), to bridge 
the gap between the southern province and the 
rural areas and outer islands where the bulk of 
the Kanak population live. The southern part of 
New Caledonia’s main island Grande Terre hosts 
major economic infrastructure, and the capital 
Noumea has long been the centre of economic 
and political power. In contrast, the north of the 
main island and the outlying Loyalty Islands have 
had less economic development, and the process 
of colonial settlement pushed the bulk of the 
indigenous Kanak population into tribal reserves. 
Kanaks make up the overwhelming majority of 
the population of the Loyalty Islands (97 per 
cent) and Northern Province (85 per cent), 
while settlers and immigrants from France, Wallis 
and Futuna and other areas make up nearly three 
quarters of the Southern Province population.
The Southern Province remains a stronghold of 
anti-independence sentiment, and many Europeans 
and Wallisians have only grudgingly accepted the 
agreements that mark an end to the conflict of 
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the 1980s. Against majority Kanak support, 67 
per cent of the residents of the southern province 
voted against the 1988 Matignon and Oudinot 
Accords, and over a third of southern province 
residents voted ‘No’ in the 1998 referendum to 
ratify the Noumea Accord, with 42 per cent in 
central Noumea rejecting the agreement.23 
For many years, Noumea was dubbed “ville 
blanche” (white city), but the demography of the 
southern province has been changing in recent 
years. Many Kanaks have moved to Noumea and 
its outskirts over the last fifteen years, and the 
immigrant Wallisian population has increased in 
numbers. For this reason, attempts to transform 
Noumea from a European provincial city to a 
Pacific capital take on important symbolism.24
September 24, 2003 marked the 150th 
anniversary of French colonisation of New 
Caledonia. Five years after the Noumea Accord, 
a coalition of Kanak activists and community 
leaders hoped to use the anniversary as a time to 
highlight the Kanak heritage of the nation. The 
Conseil Nationale des Droits du Peuple Autochtone 
(CNDPA, National Council for Indigenous 
People’s Rights) hoped to place a symbol of 
Kanak identity in Noumea’s central square – the 
Place des Cocotiers.
Place des Cocotiers is a popular meeting 
place in the heart of the city – it also resonates 
with symbols of French colonialism. Originally 
divided into four sections, the oldest area with 
an ancient music bandstand is the Place Feillet, 
named after the French Governor (1894-1903) 
who promoted mass European immigration and 
smallholder landowning. The Place Courbet, 
named after the French painter, has the 
monumental Céleste fountain. The Place de la 
Marne, commemorating the World War One 
battle, has an open market. Finally, the Place 
d’Olry overlooks an ornamental pond – a bronze 
statue of Admiral Olry (governor from 1878-
1880) was erected in 1893 to commemorate 
his victory over Kanak tribes during the 1878 
rebellion, when Chief Atai rose up against the 
theft of Kanak land.
The Communard leader Louise Michel (exiled 
at the time in New Caledonia) denounced Olry as 
the same type of assassin as those who butchered 
over 20,000 people during the crushing of the 
1871 Paris Commune:
The Kanaks were seeking the same liberty 
we had sought in the Commune. Let me 
say only that my red scarf, the red scarf 
of the Commune that I had hidden from 
every search, was divided in two pieces 
one night. Two Kanaks, before going to 
join the insurgents against the whites, had 
come to say goodbye to me. They slipped 
into the ocean. The sea was bad, and they 
may never have arrived across the bay, or 
perhaps they were killed in the ﬁghting. I 
never saw either of them again, and I don’t 
know which of the two deaths took them, 
but they were brave with the bravery that 
black and white both have … 
The Kanak Insurrection of 1878 failed. 
The strength and longing of human hearts 
was shown once again, but the whites shot 
down the rebels as we were mowed down 
in front of Bastion 37 and on the plains 
of Satory. When they sent the head of 
Atai to Paris, I wondered who the real 
headhunters were. As Henri Rochefort 
had once written to me: ‘the Versailles 
government could give the natives lessons 
in cannibalism’25
The Place des Cocotiers has become a rallying 
point for the city and a symbol of French pride. 
Thousands of Rassemblement supporters have 
massed in the square to cheer visiting French 
Presidents. Kanak political activists have also 
gathered there in defiance, as if encroaching on 
enemy turf. In the 1970s, young independence 
activists defaced the Olry statue with graffiti and 
put a bucket on his head – the young radicals 
went by the name Foulards Rouges (the Red 
Scarves – memories of Louise Michel). In 1987, 
at the height of armed clashes in the territory, a 
peaceful group of independence protestors sat in 
the square, armed only with balloons as a sign 
of their non-violence. They were set upon by 
CRS riot police, battered, tear gassed and driven 
from the square – images that flashed around the 
world.
In recent years, Noumea’s town council 
– dominated by the anti-independence 
Rassemblement party – has been refurbishing the 
Place des Cocotiers. Could this be an opportunity 
for a symbol of Kanak identity to be placed in this 
arena of French nostalgia? This idea of placing a 
totem in the square as a symbol of reconciliation 
became a test of wills.
The Mwâ Kâ is a carved wooden totem, 12 
metres high and weighing three tonnes. It was 
carved by sculptors from the eight customary 
aires that make up the Kanak nation: Hoot Ma 
Whaap; Paici Camuki; Djubéa-Kaponé; Ajié 
Aro; Xaracuu; Iaai; Drehu; Nengone. 
In the language of Djubéa-Kaponé (the 
southern part of the main island), Mwâ Kâ means 
‘the big house’ – the high chief’s house that all 
people belong to. It represents the eight Kanak 
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been calling on the population, and 
especially the Kanaks, to come and help 
erect the Mwâ Kâ in the place Courbet, 
situated in the middle of the Place des 
Cocotiers, between Olry (symbol of 
military repression and armed authority) 
and Feillet (symbol of free colonisation 
and proﬁt, nothing but proﬁt).
But on the day, Noumea’s conservative mayor 
Jean Lèques refused permission for the Mwâ Kâ to 
be raised in the Place Courbet. Rassemblement 
leader Jacques Lafleur offered to give the carving a 
temporary home in the courtyard of the Southern 
Province headquarters. But anti-independence 
parties dominate the province, and disappointed 
Kanaks greeted Lafleur’s offer with anger and 
scorn:
There can be no chance of a Kanak 
monument in Noumea White City, but 
Jacques Laﬂeur wants to admire his latest 
spoils of war in his own garden. Then, 
before the end of the year, it will be placed 
in front of the Museum. Hardly born, 
already mummiﬁed.27
A year later, things had changed after the 
defeat of Lafleur’s Rassemblement UMP party 
in May 2004 elections. By September 2004, 
New Caledonia had a new coalition government 
led by two women, President Marie-Noëlle 
Thémereau from the anti-independence party 
Avenir Ensemble (The Future Together) and 
Vice President Déwé Gorodé from the Party 
of Kanak Liberation (Palika). The Southern 
Province administration, now headed by Avenir’s 
Phillip Gomes, agreed that they would support 
the erection of a Kanak emblem in Noumea. The 
Mwâ Kâ was finally unveiled on 24 September 
2004 near the Museum of New Caledonia at the 
Baie de la Moselle. 
For Sarimin Boengkih, CNDPA Secretary 
General, the unveiling ceremony highlights 
improved relations between the indigenous and 
immigrant communities in New Caledonia:
It is part of the process that consists 
of gathering people towards the same 
horizon, which is to set up that new 
society, new identity. In his speech [before 
the unveiling], Phillip Gomes the head 
of the southern province said that it was 
time that the white city of Noumea would 
have a Kanak image, Kanak statue, Kanak 
sculpture, big enough to remind people 
that they were on Kanak land. Didier 
Leroux, the member of the government 
in charge of economy even said Noumea 
cannot be seen as only a white city in 
cultural areas but also the united homeland – a 
significant symbol of unity for the independence 
movement which has to work hard to transcend 
regional, religious and political divisions. The 
unity of the eight aires takes on contemporary 
political importance – the Noumea Accord has 
created a 16-member Senate for Kanak customary 
chiefs, with two representatives from each of New 
Caledonia’s eight customary regions. The Senate 
must be consulted on issues that affect Kanak 
identity (e.g. questions of land tenure).
In the lead up to the 150th anniversary of 
colonisation, Kanak activists organised a range of 
events. CNDPA publicised the anniversary with 
a book, T-shirts, leaflets and radio interviews, and 
public protests at the time of President Jacques 
Chirac’s July 2003 visit to New Caledonia.
In August, the committee organised “People, 
Land and Human Rights”, a seminar held at 
the Tjibaou Cultural Centre in Noumea, which 
called for greater recognition of the indigenous 
Kanak population in French law. For organiser 
Pastor Sailali Passa, the former President of the 
Evangelical Church of New Caledonia:
We’re trying to read the Noumea Accord 
again in the light of international law on 
the rights of indigenous peoples. We’re 
trying to see if the rights of the Kanak 
people are respected, or whether we need 
to go further. We feel that in spite of the 
preamble of the Noumea Accord, there 
are many things that are still missing. The 
Kanak people have some speciﬁc rights 
and we’re going to continue to claim those 
rights. 
Since the dawn of time, the West has 
always sought to defend individual human 
rights. But many communities and many 
governments do not recognise or do not 
support collective human rights. However, 
since the arrival of indigenous peoples 
within the structures of the United 
Nations, lots of doors have opened. 
Deﬁning human rights as the rights of 
the individual is no longer sufﬁcient. We 
have to go beyond that. There are other 
peoples who have different ways of living, 
different ways of understanding, different 
ways of relating to the land and the natural 
environment.26
On 20 September, CNDPA activists went into 
the squatter settlements around Noumea, calling 
on young people to join the events marking the 
150th anniversary. One activist noted:
For months, practically every day, we’ve 
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New Caledonia but should be seen as a 
white bubble in Melanesia, because New 
Caledonia is part of Melanesia and all 
people coming from elsewhere should 
always keep that in mind.
So this totem has now a new signiﬁcance 
because the non-Kanak people are saying 
‘Yes, we go along with you Kanak people, 
to say that this is Kanak land and we go 
along with you to build that new identity 
that we all signed for on May 1998’. Since 
it has been supported by the non-Kanak 
people, it is now representing the entire 
country and the whole population of New 
Caledonia.28
For long-time grassroots activist Gabi 
Monteapo, reflecting on the image of young 
people carrying the three-tonne Mwâ Kâ, the 
importance was not the implantation of the 
totem but the mobilisation of young people to 
carry on the spirit of independence: 
We must not forget … the feelings of these 
young Kanaks, proud to carry the totem 
like the rising tide, lifting the symbol of 
their dignity and identity as if it was a 
feather, allowing it to slide through the 
streets of Noumea like a canoe along the 
river.29
The erection of the Mwâ Kâ is not the only 
attempt to reclaim history in the White City. 
In the aftermath of the Noumea Accord, Kanak 
community leaders sought to remind city leaders 
of the hidden history of Kanak service to the 
French state during wartime. As well as many 
French New Caledonians who fought in France 
in the 1914-18 war, a Pacific Battalion was 
organised including Tahitians, New Hebrideans 
and Kanaks who went to fight in Europe (the 
great Tahitian independence leader Pouvanaa a 
Oopa, the most decorated Tahitian in the colony, 
fought in France during World War One, and 
later rallied to General de Gaulle’s Free French 
forces in 1940).30
The transformative power of warfare and 
conflict should not be underestimated – Chief 
Noel’s 1917 revolt against French colonialism 
came at a time when Kanak troops were defending 
the “motherland” in the trenches. The arrival of 
tens of thousands of American G.I.s in Noumea 
after 1942 – still marked by the names of suburbs 
such as Receiving and Motor Pool – was also 
a significant blow to French colonial racism. 
Kanak soldiers returning to New Caledonia after 
service in Europe during World War Two issued a 
petition in 1945, calling for the transformation of 
the Indigénat system that denied them citizenship 
and the vote:
“We ask to be liberated from an outdated 
regime, which is all too often oppressive and 
unjust, and which tends to keep us in a subordinate 
condition.”31
Statues play a central role in the symbolism of 
colonialism, and Noumea is dotted with markers 
such as the Monument aux Morts – the war 
memorial that commemorates New Caledonia’s 
contribution to the slaughter of the World Wars. 
On three sides of the monument, European 
soldiers who died in the Great War are listed 
by name. On the fourth side, those Kanaks who 
died are not named, but simply listed by village 
or island, even though hundreds of Kanaks and 
Tahitians fought in France in defence of la patrie. 
After the Noumea Accord was signed, Kanak 
leaders sought changes to the Monument aux 
Morts to recognise those Kanaks who had served 
and died, and some recognition was granted in an 
exhibition organised in Noumea’s Town Hall that 
ran for six months from November 1999.32
C) SAINT LOUIS – THE FAILURE OF 
THE PACIFIC WAY
The state of relations between the Kanak and 
Wallisian communities in the Southern Province 
of New Caledonia has political import, as the 
minority Kanak population in the south must win 
political support from immigrant Wallisians who 
make up at least 9 per cent of New Caledonia’s 
population. 
But the difficulties of utilising ‘the Pacific 
Way’ of consensus and discussion to promote 
community reconciliation are best shown by the 
conflict at Saint Louis. Attempts to reconcile 
a long running conflict between Kanaks and 
Wallisians in the village of Saint Louis have been 
hampered by rivalry between chiefs aligned with 
the pro-and anti-independence parties and heavy-
handed intervention by the French police. 
The tribes of Saint Louis and La Conception, 
located on the outskirts of the capital Noumea, 
were formed after 19th Century clashes in the 
north of the country. To avoid retaliation from 
those clans resisting Christianity, Catholic 
missionaries fled to the capital from Pouebo and 
Balade, taking with them Kanaks that had turned 
to the Western faith. These first “transported” 
Kanaks served as domestics and field workers 
for the Ave Maria mission at Saint Louis. Later 
other Kanaks came from different areas of the 
island to strengthen the mission work force. 
From the 1960s, Wallisian families were also 
settled on land near Saint Louis’ church. As 
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Wallisian numbers have grown, local Kanaks 
have been seeking their relocation to Noumea 
and neighbouring suburbs.
In recent years, there have been armed 
clashes between supporters of two high chiefs 
in Saint Louis: Robert Moyatea of the anti-
independence Rassemblement party and Roch 
Wamytan of Union Calédonienne, the largest 
party in the FLNKS. At the heart of the dispute 
are arguments over land and customary authority 
between the two chieftainships, but the clashes 
have serious implications for relations between 
different ethnic communities and political parties 
in the southern province. 
This dispute has spilled over into violence 
between indigenous Kanak landowners and 
islanders from Wallis and Futuna. Since 2001, 
there have been clashes between rival groups of 
Kanak and Wallisian youths, and also between 
Kanaks. Three people have been killed, including 
two young Kanaks and an islander from Futuna. 
Over a dozen other people have been shot, 
including a Lieutenant Colonel of the mobile 
police, who was seriously wounded in a shooting 
in April 2002.
At the beginning of the conflict in 2001, 
there were 171 Wallisian families living at Saint 
Louis. Half were rehoused over the next year, 
but many families remained as no public housing 
could be found for them in the capital.
Kanak and Wallisian representatives were 
initially able to forge an agreement to resolve 
the conflict in November 2002, after a series 
of community consultations. But in June 2003, 
renewed violence broke seven months of relative 
calm. After a traditional case (Kanak hut) 
was burnt down, rival groups in Saint Louis 
traded rifle fire, and police moved in firing tear 
gas to disperse the crowd.  Five people were 
wounded, including a nun and a police officer. 
Political rhetoric escalated, with opponents of 
the independence movement describing the 
treatment of the Wallisian families as tantamount 
to “ethnic cleansing.”33 
Further attempts to settle the conflict in the 
“Pacific Way” – through reconciliation between 
church leaders, the tribe’s customary chiefs and 
leaders of the Wallisian community – had some 
impact. But the dialogue was scuttled when 
politics, and the police, intervened.
In August 2003, police launched a major raid 
on Kanak communities in Saint Louis. More 
than 250 French police entered the village before 
dawn, arresting three people and seizing weapons. 
Jean-Charles Nemoadjou, member of the council 
of chiefs of Mont Dore, said that the police 
operation exacerbated anger from young people 
on all sides, damaging the faltering attempts at 
customary reconciliation and discrediting their 
elders:
There were over 250 men, ﬁve armoured 
vehicles and ﬁve trucks, as well as two 
helicopters which ﬂew overhead to 
supervise the operation. They came 
straight in and went straight to the houses 
they’d targeted…They hassled the women, 
broke people’s roofs, smashed down doors. 
They even forced young kids – no older 
than four or ﬁve years – to kneel down like 
they were terrorists! 
After that, the whole tribe of Saint Louis 
reacted. As we’ve been in conﬂict with the 
Wallisians who live at the mission on the 
other side of the river, we took up positions 
to block access for the Wallisians. We also 
blocked the access roads for the police. 
When they came with their armoured 
cars to get past our roadblocks, they ﬁred 
tear gas and grenades that damaged the 
mission. Three mothers were wounded, 
and after that they left again.34
Pro-independence leader Roch Wamytan, 
a High Chief from Saint Louis, is a former 
President of the FLNKS and was serving as Chair 
of the Melanesian Spearhead Group in 2003. 
Wamytan argues that Saint Louis is not simply 
an ethnic clash between Kanaks and Wallisians, 
arguing there are underlying political reasons for 
the latest resurgence of violence:
Behind the problem at Saint Louis is a 
fundamental issue at stake – a political 
issue. The local representatives of the 
Right have always used Saint Louis and 
its Wallisian community as a way of 
restraining the Kanak community, which 
we know is 90 per cent in support of 
independence and the FLNKS. We could 
have resolved these problems using the 
Paciﬁc Way, using custom, if the political 
stakes hadn’t been so high. They’re high 
because Saint Louis is so close to the 
capital Noumea, because the tribe largely 
supports independence and because it’s 
the home of me as High Chief.35 
The eruption of conflict in July 2003 co-
incided with the visit of French President Jacques 
Chirac that month, and Wamytan has argued 
that there were conscious provocations by 
Rassemblement supporters: 
Saint Louis has become a sort of beacon 
for these people. They hope to sabotage 
the peace and destabilise the tribe. They 
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want to point and say independence in 
New Caledonia is not viable, when you 
see what’s happening in the very village 
of the Chair of the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group, a signatory to the Noumea Accord 
and former President of the FLNKS.36
The clashes at Saint Louis provide the 
backdrop to the defeat of pro-independence 
parties at the May 2004 elections in the Southern 
province.
During the 1980s, the Wallisian population 
largely supported the conservative RPCR party. 
Young Wallisians were often at the front line of 
Right-wing militias that attacked independence 
supporters in street fighting between 1984-8. 
But after the signing of the Matignon Accords, 
Wallisians, Tahitians and ni-Vanuatu in Noumea 
were sidelined and had to define their own place 
in the country’s future.
Working class co-operation through unions 
such as the USTKE has strengthened links 
between the Kanak and islander communities. 
But efforts to create pro-independence political 
formations that can attract support across ethnic 
lines have been largely unsuccessful, with the 
FLNKS gaining most of its support from the 
Kanak community.
On 12 February 1994, members of the 
islander community formed the Rassemblement 
Démocratique Océanien (RDO). The RDO, led 
by Aloisio Sako, has declared support for Kanaks 
seeking restitution of their sovereignty, and calls 
for an independent, democratic and multiracial 
state. RDO formally joined the FLNKS in 1998, 
and Sako was elected to the new Congress on 
the FLNKS ticket in May 1999. Votes from 
the Wallisian community made a significant 
contribution to the FLNKS vote in the South, as 
many Kanaks living in Noumea are still registered 
in their own municipality in the north or islands, 
and vote by absentee ballot for candidates in the 
North or Loyalty Islands provinces.
By 2004, there were more than four Wallisian 
electoral lists competing directly for the 
community’s vote in the provincial elections.37 
Lingering distrust from the Saint Louis crisis 
and disputes within and between the major 
independence parties meant that one united 
ticket could not be forged. As a consequence, 
none of the FLNKS member parties won a 
seat after splitting the vote, even though a 
unified ticket had elected six representatives 
at the previous elections in 1999. Now only 
three conservative settler parties – Rassemblement 
UMP, Avenir Ensemble and Front National – are 
represented in the 2004 assembly. Former FLNKS 
President Wamytan lost his seat in the Southern 
Assembly and Congress and his ministerial post 
in the government.
In contrast, in the Northern province pro-
independence parties won 18 out of 22 seats. 
This de facto partition, with independence 
parties dominating the North and Loyalty Islands 
but having no representation in the Southern 
assembly, is in stark contrast to the spirit of 
partnership and “working together” that the 
Noumea Accords encourages. 
D) CULTURAL REVIVAL
A central element of reconciliation in post-
conflict New Caledonia has been the development 
of a sense of Melanesian and pan-Pacific identity. 
But with a conservative media dominated by 
RFO, commercial broadcasters and newspapers 
opposed to independence, it’s a difficult task. 
The independence movement has always 
stressed the importance of Kanak culture and 
identity as a pillar of the transition to sovereignty. 
In 1975, the late Jean-Marie Tjibaou was one of 
the main organisers of the “Melanesia 2000” 
festival in Noumea, which highlighted Kanak 
dance, culture and identity.38  But the conflict of 
the 1980s destroyed such initiatives – the Right’s 
disdain for Kanak culture was best shown when 
thousands of books and documents from the 
Office of Kanak Culture were burnt in a sinister 
auto da fé on Noumea’s rubbish dump.
In contrast, the post-Matignon period has seen 
a cultural renaissance, increasingly connected 
to the regional networks through exchanges, 
exhibitions and research. From introducing 
Kanak languages into the educational curriculum 
to hosting the Pacific Arts Festival, there are 
widespread attempts to transform local cultural 
institutions to reflect regional realities.
Young artists and musicians form kaneka 
bands in the rural towns and tribes, as well as 
the suburbs of Noumea.39 Publications like Mwà 
Véé, the journal of the Agence de Développement 
de la Culture Kanak (ADCK) document Kanak 
culture and oral history, promoting research into 
art, dance and Kanak languages. The Museum 
of New Caledonia has promoted major displays 
of Kanak artefacts and art, and millions of 
dollars have been lavished on the creation of the 
Tjibaou Cultural Centre, the Ngan Jila (“house of 
riches”) – a striking series of buildings designed 
by famous architect Renzo Piano, surrounded by 
a ceremonial path and Kanak garden.40
Women have played a crucial role in the 
cultural and political mobilisation since the 
1980s, with exhibitions of poetry, painting and 
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sculpture by Kanak artists, including painters 
such as Micheline Néporon, Denise Tiavouane 
and Paula Boi.41 Kanak playwright Pierre Gope 
has explored issues of women’s rights in Kanak 
culture and white society, touching on sensitive 
topics such as rape and incest in plays like Ou est 
le droit?42
Since the Matignon Accords, Kanak and 
Caldoche authors have published numerous 
collections of poetry and prose through small 
publishing houses such as Editions Grain du Sable. 
The publishing boom is best symbolised by Déwé 
Gorodé, the Kanak teacher and poet who currently 
serves as Vice President of New Caledonia. Ms. 
Gorodé has written in her own language Paici, as 
well as French and English.43 Her collaboration 
with other writers – such as joint publication of 
poetry with Nicolas Kurtovich (a New Caledonian 
of European heritage) – symbolises her attempts 
to transcend the ethnic divisions created by 
French colonisation. Gorodé and Kurtovich 
toured Australia in August 1997, writing poems 
together on common themes – a remarkable 
symbol of post-Matignon rapprochement. In 
2001, Kurtovich also collaborated with Kanak 
playwright Pierre Gope to create a comedic 
farce which tells the tale of Captain Cook’s 
interactions with an 18th Century Kanak, a 21st 
Century Kanak, and Princess Lotha.44
In another positive sign, a resurgence of 
interest in Caldoche history and identity is no 
longer counterposed to Kanak culture, but seen 
as complementary for some younger Caldoche.45 
As occurred in Australia in the 1950s and 
1960s, the descendants of the first European 
settlers in New Caledonia have begun to take 
pride in the territory’s convict past. In late 
1997, the community organisation La Nouvelle 
commemorated the centenary of the end of 
penal transportation, a public acknowledgement 
of convict roots that would have been difficult 
twenty years earlier.
In recent years, local researchers have studied 
the fate of criminals and political agitators 
exiled from France to the other side of the 
world. In November 2003 in a ceremony in the 
town of Bourail, a local government school was 
renamed as the Louise Michel Primary School.46 
Bourail’s mayor Guy Moulin of the conservative 
Rassemblement party and former mayor Jean-Pierre 
Aifa both attended the dedication of the school, 
reflecting Bourail’s multi-racial community. Aifa 
is a descendant of the Kabyle Algerians who 
were deported to New Caledonia in 1871, after 
rebelling against French rule in North Africa.
For some, the name Louise Michel is a 
controversial choice. Rebel leader Louise Michel 
was one of more than 4,000 people deported to the 
French colony after the fall of the Paris Commune 
in 1871, when citizens of the French capital rose 
up to establish their own government.47 For 
Kanaks, she’s a symbol of those few deportees 
who supported indigenous culture and identity. A 
local publisher in Noumea has reprinted Louise 
Michel’s writings about Kanak legends and songs, 
and in 2002 the Tjibaou Cultural Centre hosted 
a play about her time in New Caledonia.48
In November 2004, politically divided 
Caldoche historians met at the Tjibaou Centre 
(ironically considered as a “neutral” meeting 
ground) to debate their differences, meet with 
Kanaks and “discuss how to examine future 
perspectives of the expression and writing of 
History, the country’s History.” This debate 
is part of a broader process to develop new 
schoolbooks that address both Kanak and settler 
stories, and promote publication of histories of 
New Caledonia that meld Kanak and Caldoche 
perspectives – a contrast to the often polarised 
analysis of past decades.
For a younger generation of New Caledonians, 
there are some signs of blurring in the racial 
boundaries of their forebears, most evident in 
common interests in music and dope smoking – 
in April 2004, a multiracial crowd of over 20,000 
people gathered at Noumea’s Kuendu Beach for 
a reggae festival, organised by New Caledonia’s 
pro-independence trade union confederation 
USTKE.49 
Increasing political and economic engagement 
with the neighbouring Pacific region fosters this 
growing sense of Pacific identity. In 1999, New 
Caledonia gained observer status with the Pacific 
Islands Forum and political leaders are actively 
engaging with other regional institutions. But in 
the absence of armed conflict, New Caledonia 
has dropped from the headlines. Will the Pacific 
region continue to assist the transition towards a 
final decision on self-determination, at the end of 
the Noumea Accord process in 2014?
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